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Abstract
Two of the main pillars of the EU waste collection policy are the Proximity Principle and Self-Su¢ ciency Principle. According to those, waste
should be disposed as close as possible to where it has been produced. The
e¤ect of such provision is to increase the market power of local disposers,
with possible undesirable consequences for other …rms in the vertical chain.
We show through a simple spatial model that one e¤ect of the Proximity
Principle and Self-Su¢ ciency Principle is to provide an incentive to collectors and waste producers to increase the amount of separated waste.
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1. Introduction
Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) is the waste generated by households. In the
European Union (EU), local bodies at the municipality level are legally obliged
to provide a collection system for MSW, in agreement with the regulations and
guidelines set by EU directives, national laws, and regional plans.
The EU directives set the minimum targets to be reached and the environmental standards to be met; on top of that, the EU also requires that MSW should
be handled and disposed close to the location where it is generated. This policy is rooted in the two pillars of Self-Su¢ ciency Principle (SSP) and Proximity
Principle (PP) and it is aimed to reach two main goals: the …rst is to prevent
the creation of pollution havens in regions with low environmental standards; the
second is to enhance local communities’awareness of their environmental responsibilities.1 From an economic viewpoint, however, the policy also has the e¤ect of
creating market power for the waste disposers operating in the district.
The MSW industry has a vertical structure, re‡ecting the three main phases
of MSW processing. In the …rst phase households and, ultimately, local councils,
generate MSW. The second phase is the collection of MSW: a municipality based
collector picks up waste from the households. In this phase households/local councils do exert some e¤ort to separate recyclable from undi¤erentiated waste. This is
an important activity and it is rooted in another EU principle, the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). According to it, all subjects acting along the goods
production and retail chains are responsible for the …nal diversion of those goods
when transformed into waste. As a consequence, the EPR and its reuse-recover
targets potentially reduce the amount of waste that reaches disposal facilities.
In the third and last phase, the collector brings the waste to a disposer that
processes MSW: separated waste can be recycled, while undi¤erentiated waste is
either processed in a land…ll or by an incinerator. Mainly due to scale and density
economies, the collection phase can be considered a legal monopoly; moreover, the
public/merit good nature of MSW advocates for the implementation of a compulsory public service.2 The disposal segment instead could in principle operate
in a competitive regime. The provisions of the SSP and PP, however, force local
councils and collectors to …nd a disposing facility inside a de…ned district and
1
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/98/EC; please refer to Silvestri (2014) for
further discussion of these principles.
2
An inappropriate or ine¢ cient collection causes signi…cant negative externalities to the local
community; see, for example, D’Alisa et al., (2010).
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among a restricted number of disposers, allowing the latter to potentially exploit
a scarcity rent. It is also noticeable that such principles only apply to the MSW
segment: industrial and commercial waste can be disposed outside the producing
municipality, e¤ectively allowing competition between disposers.
In this paper, we set up a simple spatial model of MSW production, collection and disposal. The model allows analysing the major economic e¤ects of the
EU policy and, in particular, the costs and bene…ts of the SSP and PP provisions. The analysis provides relevant policy implications. First of all, we con…rm
that the SSP and PP principles on waste collection, limiting competition between
disposers, increase the cost of MSW collection to the local community; however,
we also highlight a subtler consequence of such principles: the higher cost of
disposing MSW leads households and local councils to exert more e¤ort and, in
turn, increase the amount of separated collection, decreasing instead the waste
sent for disposal. The latter substitution e¤ect may be a more or less intended
consequence of the current EU regulation and it constitutes, perhaps, a further
rationale behind the imposition of the SSP and PP principles. Aggregate level
evidence from the 27 EU countries suggests indeed a negative correlation between
the percentage of unselected MSW processed by a disposer (land…ll or incinerator)
and the average disposing costs ( 0:65) and a positive correlation between the
percentage of separated waste and the average disposing costs (0:73). The latter
is illustrated in Figure 1. As liberalization in other regulated sectors (e.g. gas,
electricity) has led to a decrease in the …nal price to users, we may conjecture that
a similar process in the MSW segment would increase the percentage of disposed
waste and reduce households’and councils’e¤ort for separated collection.

Fig.1 Source: Eurostat (2010).
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To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the …rst papers to model the MSW
industry in all its phases and participating agents. Most of the existing literature
on MSW and its management has focused on either: (i) the environmental implications of waste and policies to correct welfare distortions (Davies and Doble,
2004; Jenkins et al., 2004; Caplan et al., 2006) or (ii) competition for the market
(Demsetz, 1968), according to which natural monopolies can be managed by private …rms whose right to operate is entrusted by the government via competitive
tendering (Williamson, 1976; La¤ont and Tirole, 1994, Ch.7). We focus instead
on competition in the MSW market (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Crocker
and Masten, 1996; Massarutto, 2007). The closest contribution to ours is Choe
and Fraser (1999). They also model the market for MSW but they focus on the
environmental e¤ects of dumping and illegal disposal and on welfare enhancing
policy intervention in the sector.3 Finally, the model in this paper can be adapted
to address a number of other relevant and related issues. For example, Silvestri
(2014) provides an in depth analysis of the EU MSW market and focuses on related issues like: (a) the welfare e¤ects of the SSP and PP principles and compares
the current regulation with other possible regulatory instruments; (b) the analysis
of the implications of the sector’s structure for entrance of new disposers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
model. In Section 3 we solve the model and compare the "status quo", in which
the SSP and PP are enforced, and with a scenario in which the SSP and PP are
relaxed and the disposal sector is exposed to more competition. In Section 4 we
brie‡y discuss our results and conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2. A spatial model of MSW
Consider two bordering geographical areas (i = A; B); consistently with the previous discussion, in each area there is a Local Council (LC), a monopolistic Collector
(C) and a disposing facility (D).
Local councils. LCs are representative of a municipal community that produces an amount of MSW Qi , that, for analytical convenience, we shall normalise
to 1. According to the current legislation, all the MSW must be removed. A
fraction qi 1 is unseparated waste. As a consequence of the EPR principle, the
removal of separated MSW is free for households and, hence, LCs: this provides
3

A stream of literature has carefully modelled the MSW sector to analyze the optimal design
of solid waste management programs: competition, however, is usually not addressed. See Di
Corato and Montinari (2014) for a recent contribution.
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an incentive to put costly e¤ort ei in separating waste. The previous discussion
can be summarized by the following utility function of a given LC:
UiLC = ui

pi qi

ei ;

(2.1)

where pi is the unit price paid by the LC for the collection of unseparated MSW.
The quantity of separated collection di depends on the e¤ort but also on the available selection capacity ki , provided by the local collector. We shall assume that
waste separation takes place according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
1

1

di = ei2 ki2 ; di

1:

(2.2)

In other words, separated waste is the output originating from three inputs: the
raw material, Qi , that we normalised to 1, the LCs e¤ort, ei , and the installed
capacity for separated collection, ki :
Collectors. The monopolist collectors operate exclusively in their area; however, where waste is disposed depends on the regulatory regime. Under the current
EU regime, unseparated waste must be disposed in the local area; on the contrary,
if the provisions of the SSP and PP are relaxed, collectors have no obligation in
disposing the picked unseparated waste in the local or the external land…ll. The
collector is chosen as a franchised or natural monopolist to operate in the collection segment. The collector also provides the facilities for LCs to separate waste:
in particular, they install a selection capacity ki and investment in capacity has
a quadratic cost.4 The (exogenous) unit price pi for unseparated waste is set by
the regulator; similarly, the unit price for separated waste collection pei is also
exogenously set according to the EPR system.
We capture the geographical aspects, a de…ning characteristic of this sector,
through a simple model à la Hotelling (1929). Area A and B are represented as
unit length lines, so that the overall market has a total length of 2 (see Figure
2). Households pertaining to a LC are uniformly distributed along the line in
both areas, with xi 2 [0; 2] denoting the location of a speci…c household. Disposal
facilities are located at the extremes of each line, i.e. disposer A is located at x = 0
and disposer B at x = 2. Collectors face linear transportation costs in picking-up
unseparated waste and bringing it to the location of the facilities.5 We denote the
4

Quadratic costs are assumed for analytical convenience but any convex function would not
a¤ect our results.
5
For simplicity, we do not consider any intermediate recollection, such as transitional places
where to accumulate and treat the unselected waste that come from households.
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total transport costs of gathering the waste and bringing it to the disposal facility
as Ti .

Fig. 2 An example of deregulated spatial waste market.
Taking for reference the collector operating in area A, collector A’s pro…t can
be written as:
(
(pA aA )qA xAB + (pA aB )qA (1 xAB ) + peA dA kA2 TA (xAB ) if xAB < 1
C
=
A
(pA aA )qA + peA dA kA2 TA (xAB )
if xAB > 1
(2.3)
where xAB < 1 is the fraction of unseparated waste taken to the local disposer,
whereas the rest is brought for disposal at the external facility; if xAB > 1 the
collector brings all unseparated waste to the local disposer. Clearly, under the
current EU regulation, xAB = 1 is enforced and it is not a variable of choice of the
collector. As it will become clear, if regulation is lifted, xAB will depend on the
disposal prices at the two facilities and on the transport costs. The total transport
costs depend on xi and can be explicitly expressed as:
#
8 "
xAB
1
R
R
>
>
>
udu +
(2 u) du
if xAB < 1
<tq
0
xAB
(2.4)
TA (xAB ) =
>
R1
>
>
if x > 1
:tq udu
AB

0

and similar expressions hold for both the pro…ts and transport costs of collector
B.
Disposers. The disposing facility Di receives the unseparated MSW and charges
ai for each unit to be disposed. Notice that ai is the same, no matter what is
the origin of the waste. If the SSP and PP are relaxed, in fact, the facility may
receive waste from both the local and the outside collectors: the disposers are not
6

allowed to discriminate waste according to its origin. The pro…ts of disposer A
are, then:
8
>aA [qA + qB (xAB 1)] if aA < aB
<
D
(2.5)
aA q A
if aA = aB
A (aA ; aB ) =
>
:
aA qA xAB
if aA > aB

and the pro…ts of disposer B can be written in a similar way.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Disposers decide the amount charged, ai , for the disposal of unserparated
waste;
2. Collectors choose the selection capacity ki for separated collection and is
obliged to collect any unseparated waste;
3. Local councils exert e¤ort ei for separated collection and produce unseparated waste qi :

3. Analysis
3.1. The choice of e¤ort
Proceeding by backward induction, we start by solving for the LCs choices on the
e¤ort to be put into separated collection and the amount of unseparated waste.
These choices hold for any level of the installed selection capacity by collectors
and prices chosen by the disposers. Given (2.2) and the fact that qi = 1 di , the
LC i maximises utility (2.1). The optimal e¤ort choice of LC i is obtained for:
ei =

ki p2i
;
4

(3.1)

which, in turn, implies that the unseparated collection is:
ki pi
:
2

qi = 1

(3.2)

According to (3.1) and rather intuitively, the e¤ort exerted by households and LCs
in separated collection is positively related to the selection capacity installed by
the collector, ki and by the price of unseparated collection, pi . A high collection
price encourages the substitution of unseparated waste with separated one, as
con…rmed by (3.2). As the LCs never interact, their choices are not directly
a¤ected by the regulation regime, so these results apply to both the regimes that
we analyse.
7

3.2. Collectors’choices
Whereas the EU regulation constitutes the current status quo, it arises a special
case in our model: hence, we shall …rst analyze the case of no regulation. If no
regulation is imposed, from (2.3), it is immediate to …nd that:
xAB = 1 +

aB

aA
2t

(3.3)

;

i.e. whether it is collector A or collector B to bring unseparated waste to the
disposer in a di¤erent area depends on the price di¤erential, aB aA . If the latter
is non-negative, then xAB
1. We can then start by assuming, without loss of
1. Given (3.1) and (3.2), collectors maximize pro…ts C
generality, that xAB
A
and C
with
respect
to
k
and
k
respectively.
The
…rst
order
conditions
are:
A
B
B
p
p
8kA pA kA + p2A kA [2 (aA pA + peA ) + t]
@ C
A
p
=
=0
@kA
4pA kA
p
p
16tkB pB kB p2B kB (aB aA )2 4t (aB pB + peB ) 2t2
@ C
B
p
=
=0
@kB
8tpB kB
Solving these simultaneously allows …nding the optimal selection capacity to be
installed for separated collection:6
pA
[2 (aA
8
pB
[2 (aB
=
8

kA =
kB

pA + peA ) + t] ;
pB + peB ) + t]

(3.4)
pB
(aB
16t

aA )2 ;

(3.5)

and, consequently, the resulting unseparated collection:
qA = 1
qB = 1

p2A
[2 (aA pA + peA ) + t] ;
16 "
p2B
4 (aB pB + peB ) + 2t
32

(3.6)
aA )2

(aB
t

#

:

(3.7)

Under the assumption xAB
1, collector A brings all of the waste generated in
area A to the local disposer. Hence, his selection capacity choice is not directly
a¤ected by the price of disposing in area B. If the latter inequality is strictly
satis…ed, this is not the case for collector B. In absence of regulation and as the
6

It is immediate to verify that the second order conditions for a maximum hold.
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price of disposing in area A is lower than in B (aA < aB ), then the waste of
households located between 1 and xAB is brought for disposal to area A. The rest
of the waste, gathered between xAB and 2, is disposed in area B. Clearly, then,
the disposal price di¤erential aB aA a¤ects the choices of collector B, as it can
be seen in (3.5) and (3.7). In particular, (3.5) shows that the higher the price
of disposal in both areas, the higher is the incentive for the collector B to install
selection capacity.
If the EU regulation is imposed and xAB = 1, the optimal selection capacity
and unseparated collection are, respectively:
pi
[2 (ai pi + pei ) + t] ;
(3.8)
kiEU =
8
p2i
[2 (ai pi + pei ) + t] :
(3.9)
qiEU = 1
16
Comparing (3.4) and (3.8) it is clear that, for a given price of disposal aA , the
choice of collector A is not a¤ected by the regulatory regime.
3.3. Disposers’choices
In absence of EU regulation, the disposers maximize their pro…ts given the choices
of the LCs, (3.1), and the collectors, (3.4)-(3.7). As we focus on the case xAB 1,
the pro…ts functions of the disposers are, respectively:
D
A (aA ; aB )
D
B (aA ; aB )

= aA [qA + qB (xAB
= aB qB (2 xAB )

1)]

(3.10)
(3.11)

According to the previous assumption on xAB , disposer A receives the unseparated
waste from both areas, whereas disposer B focuses on the remaining local waste.
In case EU regulation is holding and xAB = 1 is enforced, no waste can be
transferred from one area to the other; as a consequence, the pro…t functions are:
D
i

= ai qiEU

(3.12)

First, we can fully characterize the equilibrium if the SSP and PP principles
hold. The following lemma highlights the disposers’price choices.
Lemma 1. The disposers’price choices in presence of the EU regulation are:
aEU
=
i

1 16
+ 2pi
4 p2i
9

2e
pi

t :

(3.13)

Lemma 1 shows that under regulation the disposers’ price choices in each
area are completely independent. In other words, EU regulation isolates local
disposers from the competition of disposers from other areas. The equilibrium
price of disposal is a¤ected by the parameters of the model in a complex way.
First, aEU
depends negatively on the price of separated collection, pei , and on the
i
transport cost, t. The price of disposal also depends non-monotonically on the
increases if the collection price is su¢ ciently
price of unseparated collection: aEU
i
high. These e¤ects depend on the way the parameters in‡uence the collector’s
choice for selection capacity and how this, in turn, impacts on the demand for
unseparated collection, qiEU and, consequently, disposal.
We can then turn our attention to the e¤ects of abandoning regulation and the
SSP and PP principles. In this case we cannot fully characterize the equilibrium
and provide the equilibrium expressions for the prices of disposal. However, the
following results can be stated.
Proposition 2. (a) If in presence of the EU regulation the equilibrium prices were
EU
identical, aEU
A = aB , abandoning regulation leads to a decrease in the disposal
prices ai in both areas, i = A; B;
EU
(b) if aEU
A < aB , a su¢ cient condition for the disposal price of A to decrease
EU
if regulation is abandoned is: aEU
A > aB =2. The disposal price of B decreases.
(c) If abandoning EU regulation leads to lower disposal prices, then the incentives to build capacity for separated collection, ki , to exert e¤ort ei and, ultimately, the overall amount of separated collection as a whole, di are reduced.
Proposition 2 states the main results of the paper. In particular, part (a) and
(b) identify the e¤ects of relaxing the prescriptions of the current EU regulation
on waste collection and disposal.
Part (a) establishes that if two areas, regions or countries have very similar
prices of disposal in the current status-quo, opening the market for disposal and
giving the possibility to collectors to transport waste to other neighbouring areas
would lead to a reduction in the prices of disposal. The intuition is very simple: a
small unilateral decrease in the price of disposal from aEU
would increase pro…ts
i
as it allows to extend the market size. In other words, the collector from the
neighbouring area would consider bringing a small share of the waste, produced
by households located near the border, to the disposal facility that reduced the
price. As both disposers face this pressure to reduce prices, the resulting unregulated equilibrium features lower prices in both areas. Allowing disposal in
10

other areas has a "pro-competitive e¤ect" that decreases the cost of the disposal
of unseparated waste in both areas.
Part (b) extends the result to the case in which areas are heterogeneous, which
is re‡ected in a di¤erent price of disposal, aEU
i , in the regulated status quo. In
particular, the result establishes that the "pro-competitive e¤ect" of abandoning
regulation is very likely to take place also in this case. A su¢ cient, but not
necessary, condition for the price of disposal to decrease is that areas are not too
heterogeneous and, more precisely, that the status-quo disposal prices are not too
di¤erent. If, as we assumed, area A is characterized by a lower disposal price, the
pro-competitive e¤ect of abandoning EU regulation prevails if the price is more
EU
than half of the price in area B, i.e. aEU
A > aB =2. Moreover, the higher price
disposer, DB , is surely going to decrease its price in response to deregulation.
Hence, unless areas are particularly heterogeneous, part (b) shows that it is very
likely that the prices of disposing unseparated waste decrease when waste can
travel across areas.
The intuition for this second result is more intricate. In particular, according
to (A.3), the e¤ect of unilaterally decreasing the disposal price in area A following
a lift of the EU regulation can now be written as:
@qB
@ D
A
EU EU @xAB
+ aEU
jaA =aEU
= F OCAEU (aEU
(x
A
A ) + aA q B
A
|
{z
}
@aA
@aA
@aA AB
|
{z
}
|
{z
=0
Pro-competitive e¤ect

Indirect e¤ect on qB

1) + qBEU (xAB 1) :
|
{z
}
} Infra-marginal gain

(3.14)
In (3.14) there are three new terms than in case EU regulation still holds. The
usual "pro-competitive e¤ect", identi…ed in part (a), is now captured by the second
term and it pushes down the disposal price of A. However, there are now two extra
terms. The third term captures the negative relation between the unseparated
waste in B, qB , and the price of disposal aA : as a share of waste is "exported"
from B to A, a higher disposal price of A increases the average disposal cost
in area B and that acts to decrease the household production of unseparated
waste. This e¤ect, that we shall call "indirect e¤ect" on qB , clearly goes in the
same direction of the "pro-competitive e¤ect". The fourth term of (3.14), instead,
captures the "infra-marginal gain" in pro…ts due to abandoning regulation. This
is related to the new market share obtained, as with no regulation xAB > 1,
and clearly encourages disposer A to increase its price. The complex balance of
these three e¤ects determines whether the price of disposal will decrease or not
in area A: the condition provided on the prices of disposal establishes when the
"pro-competitive" and "indirect" e¤ects are surely dominating the "infra-marginal
11

gain". Matters are much simpler when looking at disposer B: in that case all the
e¤ects univocally point in the direction of a price decrease.
Finally, part (c) establishes the e¤ects of a possible decrease in the price of disposing unseparated waste. Given the comparative statics obtained in the previous
stages of the game it is simple to see that the "pro-competitive e¤ect" identi…ed
at the disposal layer of the waste market has an important consequence: higher
competition in disposal can reduce and hinder the amount of resources dedicated
to separated waste (selection capacity and household e¤ort), leading to an overall
decrease of the separation achieved by the local communities.
3.3.1. A special case: symmetric areas
We now focus on the special case of symmetric areas. This case may be of particular interest when considering regions with similar characteristics and it has the
further advantage that equilibria in both scenarios can be characterized, which
may be appealing for possible empirical applications of the model.7
If areas A and B are symmetric we have: pA = pB = p and peA = peB = pe. The
disposal equilibrium price under EU regulation is still:
aEU =

1 16
+ 2p
4 p2

2e
p

t :

If regulation is lifted, instead, the disposers choose the equilibrium price:
q
4 (p3 p2 pe + 8)2 4p2 + 65p4 t2
1 16
a =
+ 2p 2e
p + 7t
:
4 p2
4p2
As a corollary of Proposition 2, the next result follows:

Corollary 3. If areas A and B are symmetric, abandoning EU regulation leads
to a decrease in the prices of disposal: a < aEU . The latter implies a reduction
in the incentives to build capacity for separated collection, k , to exert e¤ort e
and, ultimately, the overall amount of separated collection, d .
The corollary reinforces the message of Proposition 2. Relaxing the current EU
regulation on waste management would make the disposer’s segment of the market
7

Silvestri and Ghinoi (2015) apply an adapted version of this model to waste management
in the region of Lombardy in Italy.
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more competitive, with a decrease in the prices paid for disposal. However, the
substitution between unseparated and separated collection lowers the collectors’
incentives to invest in selection capacity. This, in turn, has a negative e¤ect
on the e¤ort exerted by local councils and households, resulting in a lower and
undesirable level of unseparated collection.

4. Discussion
This paper provides two main contributions. The …rst it is to formalise in a
simple spatial model the economics of waste collection in the EU. The second
is to highlight the main economic e¤ects of EU regulation of the waste sector
on market outcomes. In particular, our model con…rms that the SSP and PP
principles, on which the current EU regulation on waste collection is based, have
the e¤ect of limiting competition between disposers. Our main result suggests that
an intuitive, "pro-competitive" e¤ect may operate if regulation is abandoned: this
is likely to be the case not only when areas are very similar but also when they are
rather heterogeneous. Only if areas are very heterogeneous the "pro-competitive
e¤ect" of opening to disposers’ competition may not reduce the prices. This
intuitive e¤ect, however, has another possible consequence: more competitive
disposal markets, reduce the costs of collection and that, in turn, leads to lower
incentives to build selection capacity and reduced incentives for households and
local councils to engage in separated collection. Regulation, then, may be better
suited to encourage recycling and separated collection.
The latter e¤ect on separated collection incentives may be one more possible
rationale behind the current EU regulation. One view, popularized by Hotelling
(1931) and Buchanan (1969), asserts that less competitive market structures may
be desirable, in some cases, to limit negative environmental externalities.8 We
highlight a similar e¤ect within a model that captures the complicated structure
of the waste collection and disposal sector. The EU policy, in this context, seems
to have one more advantage, beyond its usually declared objectives (preventing
the creation of pollution havens, above all): increasing the local communities’
incentives to engage in recycling and separated collection.
Whereas our model has attempted to capture the main features of the MSW
sector, our results were obtained under a number of simplifying assumptions.
For example, one implication of our model is that the regime does not in‡uence
8

"It has been argued that market imperfection especially the polar case of monopoly, is the
conservationists’best friend" (Hotelling, 1931).
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the regulated price of collection of both the separated, pe, and the unseparated
waste, p. The price of unseparated collection at least is likely to be related to
the price of disposal. One way of capturing such a feature in our model is, for
example, by assuming that the regulator applies a …xed mark-up to set the price
of unseparated collection, e.g. pi = i ai with i > 1. Such a case is tractable
and it is easy to verify that the equilibrium expressions, substituting the relations
above, are una¤ected up to stage 2, i.e. up to the collectors’choices. However, as
the solution of the …rst stage, in which prices of the disposers are chosen, is less
straightforward and the expressions are rather complicated, in the paper we choose
to focus on the basic case. Our results, however, turn out to be even sharper in the
extended model. The reason is rather intuitive: abandoning the current regulatory
regime, in fact, leads also to an adjustment in the relative price of unseparated
collection. The "pro-competitive e¤ect", then, implies a lower disposal price but
also, proportionally, even less separated waste. A similar e¤ect is likely to operate
also in case the total amount of waste produced by the local council, that we
normalised to one in our model, is allowed to vary between regimes: relaxing the
current regulation would lead to the lower prices in the unseparated section of
the market and this is likely to increase the size of the overall waste produce by
councils.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
If EU regulation is in place, the …rst order conditions are symmetric for the two
areas and can be written as:
F OCiEU (ai ) = qiEU + ai

@qiEU
= 0:
@ai

(A.1)

Importantly, the …rst order condition is una¤ected by the variables and parameters
relating to area j. As @qiEU =@ai = p2i =8 < 0, then F OCiEU (ai ) is decreasing in
ai and a unique equilibrium exists. Substituting the relevant expressions, the
equilibrium can also be characterized as (3.13).
Q.E.D.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The e¤ect of abandoning the current EU regulation is considered. Given our
assumption on xAB , there are two possible cases, depending on the "fundamentals"
EU
(i.e. pi and pei ): (a) the equilibrium is such that aEU
A = aB ; (b) the equilibrium
EU 9
is such that aEU
A < aB . We shall consider each in turn, corresponding to parts
(a) and (b) of the Proposition.
EU
(a) If aEU
A = aB and regulation stops being enforced, according to (3.3) we
shall still have xAB = 1. Suppose disposer A considers decreasing the price from
aEU
A ; in that case the relevant pro…t function is (3.10), as xAB > 1 following the
considered price decrease. The impact of the change in the price, evaluated at
EU
aEU
A = aB , can be written as:
@ D
@qB
A
EU
jaA =aEU
= F OCAEU (aEU
1) + aEU
(x
A ) + qB (xAB
A
A
@aA
@aA AB
|
{z
=0

EU @xAB
1) + aEU
< 0;
A qB
@aA
} |
{z
}

(A.2)
where the …rst three terms are zero as a consequence of @
being evaluated
at the EU equilibrium. Hence, (A.2) implies that a unilateral price decrease,
increases disposer A pro…ts. A similar argument applies to disposer B. These
imply that ai < aEU
i .
D
A =@aA

9

EU
Notice that if the equilibrium is such that aEU
A > aB and xAB < 1, the proof follows from
case (b) inverting the roles of A and B.
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EU
(b) If aEU
A < aB then abandoning regulation would imply xAB > 1 even if no
price adjustment is made. From the perspective of disposer A, (3.10) is still the
relevant pro…t function and the impact of a change in price is still:

@ D
A
EU
EU
EU
EU = F OC
j
A (aA ) + qB (xAB
|
{z
} |
{z
@aA aA =aA
=0

+

@qB
1) + aEU
(x
A
}
@aA AB
|

EU @xAB
1) + aEU
:
A qB
@aA
{z
}

(A.3)
In this case, however, the second term is positive as xAB > 1, whereas the last
two terms are negative. The sign of (A.3) then depends on:
= qBEU xAB

1 + aEU
A

@qB
@xAB
(x
+ aEU
A
@aA
@aA AB

1) ;

and although the expression is hard to sign in general, after substitution it can
be re-written as:
2
1 EU
aEU
2
A pB
= qBEU
aB
2aEU
aEU
aEU
;
A
A
B
2
2t
32t
< 0 and, as a consequence, for
> aEU
implying that aEU
B =2 is su¢ cient for
A
EU
aA < aA .
From the point of view of disposer B abandoning regulation would imply a
decrease in the demand (2 xAB < 1) even if no price adjustment is made. The
relevant pro…ts are then (3.11) and the impact of a change in price, evaluated at
the EU regulation equilibrium, can be written as:
@ D
B
EU
EU = qB
j
(2
@aB aB =aB
|

@qB
(2
xAB ) + aEU
B
@aB
{z
EU (a )
<F OCB
B

xAB )
}

EU @xAB
<0
aEU
B qB
@a
|
{z B}

(A.4)

The latter inequality holds as the …rst two terms are lower than the equivalent
terms in (A.1) as 2 xAB < 1, whereas the last term is negative. As such, disposer
B always reduces his price if regulation is lifted: aB < aEU
B .
(c) If abandoning regulation leads to a decrease in disposal prices ai , then
the results on selection capacity, e¤ort and overall amount of separated collection
@k
follow directly from the results obtained at Stage 2 and 3. In particular, as @ai > 0
i
a lower disposal price implies a lower selection capacity; this, in turn, implies:
@di @ki
@ei @ki
> 0 and
> 0:
@ki @ai
@ki @ai
Q.E.D.
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A.3. Proof of Corollary 3
The claim follows directly from part (a) of Proposition 2. However, as the equilibrium is fully characterized, it is su¢ cient to compute the disposal price di¤erential:
q
4 (p3 p2 pe + 8)2 4p2 + 65p4 t2
EU
a=a
a = 2t
:
4p2
The only zero of

ai is:

2
b
t = 2 p3
p

p2 pe + 8 ;

hence ai is either always positive or always negative for all other values of t. As
@ 2 a=@t2 0 then a is always negative, implying a < aEU . The implications
of the result on selection capacity follow directly from part (c) of Proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
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